The article examines the contemporary contradictions surrounding objectivity in the philosophy of science. On the one hand, historians and philosophers of science regard objectivity as a criterion of scientificity, a marker of scientific value, and a scientific virtue. On the other hand, they highlight its contested status, irreducible complexity, and question its continued relevance. The article proposes a framework for engaging with the concept of objectivity, one that reveals the historical problems it addresses, traces its transformations over time, and demonstrates (...) how the diversity of its meaningsas well as doubts about its significanceremain relevant today. This approach bridges the philosophy of science and historical epistemology while also illustrating the growing community of stakeholders invested in preserving objectivity. In this analysis, objectivity is explored in three key dimensions. First, it is examined in its origins as a concept that addresses the problem of connecting the elements of cognition, emphasizing its mediating function. Second, objectivity is interpreted as a regulative ideal, the pursuit of which seeks to overcome the subjectivity of the knower. Third, it is analyzed in its historicity, understood as its capacity to renew itself in response to evolving challenges. The article identifies the weakness of the concept, which leads to skepticism about objectivity, as its tendency to devolve into objectivism. Conversely, its strength lies in its potential to engage the modern scientific community and researchers of science, particularly through interpretations that do not seek to eliminate subjectivity but rather to expand its boundaries. (shrink)

The author explores to the conditions for implementation of science as a public good and connects these conditions with the problem of epistemic injustice. She proposes the hypothesis that in order to implement science as a public good or actualize it as a source of diversity, it is necessary to focus theoretical attention on the concept of distributed scientific cognition and allow for the possibility of relevant practices. The rules of distributed scientific cognition practices can and should ensure both the (...) epistemic constructiveness of science and its epistemic justice, legitimizing the openness of access to scientific cognition distributed outside the scientific community. The text reveals the main characteristics of the concept of distributed cognition, introduced by E. Hutchins. The author proposes additionally take into account two meanings of distributed scientific cognition – extensive and intensive. The first refers to the possibility of unlimited addition of participants in cognition with a reasonable relevance of their positions. The second opens up the perspective of working on a distribution that has not yet happened and suggests that any epistemic position can be distributed. She also demonstrates the applicability of the concept to relevant scientific practices related to both professional scientific communication and public communication of science. (shrink)

The author consider critical remarks of opponents about the idea of distributed scientific cognition, its connection with the concept of science as a source of epistemic diversity. She notes the importance of the concept of consensus and unification of scientific disciplines, and emphasizes relevance the distribution of scientific cognition binding the diverse in situations of problematic unity.